Pure rent taxation and allocation of capital in a two-sector open economy: A long-run analysis

In this paper, the long-run incidence of a tax on pure rent is analyzed in an OLG two-sector small open economy, in which one sector produces a capital good and one sector a consumer good. Contrary to what is obtained in a one-sector closed economy, a land rent tax does not necessarily foster nonhumam wealth accumulation and capital formation. The accommodating scheme for the government budget plays a crucial role for the effects of pure rent taxation. A rent tax stimulates nonhuman wealth if distortionary taxes on wealth or on income from nonland inputs are alleviated. The mechanism spurring capital formation is brought into action, instead, only when the rent tax is matched by a fall in capital taxation or, if the capital sector is capital intensive, by an increase in government spending on the capital good.     

Government size,composition of public spending and economic growth in Brazil

The performance of the fiscal policy is largely affected by the relationship between government size, composition of public spending and economic growth. We use a theoretical framework to find optimal relations among these variables and confront them with a panel data for the Brazilian states. Private capital and government spending are substitute inputs in production as the Brazilian states require provision of public spending to fill gaps in the underdeveloped private sector. Public investment and current government expenditures are combined in fixed ratios in the overall government spending due to strong rigidity of the public budget. The optimal share of public investment is considerably lower than current expenditures, as occurs in developing countries characterized by low economic dynamism. Finally, the average tax burden from the data is below the estimated optimal level, meaning that there is space for increasing tax rate without harming economic growth for some Brazilian states.     

Dynamic Tax Evasion with Habit Formation in Consumption*

We model the optimal intertemporal decision of an agent who chooses tax evasion and consumption, over an infinite lifetime horizon, where consumption is driven by habits. We find the following: (i) tax evaders reduce consumption in the early stages of habit accumulation and increase it over time; (ii) habit formation has a dampening effect on tax evasion; (iii) neglecting tax evasion can lead to habit overestimation; (iv) the effect of the tax rate on tax evasion is ambiguous; (v) heavy fines are more efficient than frequent controls in reducing tax evasion.     

A Common Base Answer to the Question “Which Country Is Most Redistributive?”*

We believe that what most authors have in mind when referring to the “most redistributive country” is a tax and transfer schedule that is most redistributive across all pre-tax and transfer income distributions. In order to measure each country's tax and transfer redistribution according to the same baseline, we suggest using the transplant-and-compare method of Dardanoni and Lambert (2002, Journal of Public Economics 86, 99–122) to establish a common base. The redistributive effects of countries’ tax and transfer schedules are illustrated by employing microdata on eight countries from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Of these eight countries, Finland is found to be the most redistributive country, according to the common base method.     

Moving markets? Government bond investors and microeconomic policy changes

Do sovereign bond markets react systematically to microeconomic policy reforms? Some observers suggest that investors are very attentive to supply‐side policies such as those related to labor markets, corporate taxation, and product standards. They argue that, along with macroeconomic outcomes and broad financial market conditions, such reforms affect sovereign bond premiums, for developed as well as emerging economies. In contrast, we predict few systematic effects of supply‐side policy reforms on sovereign bond market outcomes. Our theory draws on a standard three‐equation model of the economy, widely accepted among economic and finance professionals. That model makes few clear predictions regarding the anticipated effects of microeconomic policy changes; as a result, we expect that such reforms will not generate systematic market reactions. Our analyses, based on daily data from 37 countries from 2004 to 2012, indeed reveal little evidence of a systematic bond market reaction to the 47 most significant reforms to corporate taxation and labor market regulation. These results call into question the notion that “bond market vigilantes” play a central role in compelling governments to enact specific microeconomic policy changes.     

The impact of environmental regulation on Chinese spatial development

We examine the relationship between environmental regulation and spatial development in China. Exploiting changes in national pollution standards for three industries, ammonia, paper and cement, we measure the impact of environmental regulation on industry productivity. Our results suggest that national pollution standards do not affect industry productivity, but they reallocate productivity spatially. We show that regulated industries located in developing cities increase their productivity compared to similar industries in other cities. This means that environmental regulation affects the spatial distribution of technology in China and might influence long‐term spatial development by reducing geographical disparities.     

地方政府间税收竞争会诱发过度投资吗*

政府行为的策略变化是否会引起企业行为的变化？本文以地方政府间税收竞争为切入点，研究其对企业过度投资的影响。本文首先利用工业企业数据库中的制造业企业，测算出企业投资效率并保留其中过度投资的样本；其次利用地级市经济社会数据构造出税收竞争指标，实证检验税收竞争对企业过度投资的影响，并进行相应的异质性分析和稳健性检验。实证研究发现税收竞争显著促进企业过度投资，而且对非国有企业的过度投资行为影响更大。本文的研究结论对当前我国产业结构调整、破解产能过剩等问题有一定的借鉴意义。     

地方政府经济竞争下的企业负担*——来自上市公司的经验证据

本文基于分权体制下政企之间的两阶段动态博弈模型以及在此基础上构建的计量模型，将地级市之间经济竞争程度与A股非金融类上市公司数据相匹配，验证了地方政府经济竞争程度与企业实际税负之间的关系。研究结果表明，当地方政府所面临的经济竞争程度越激烈时，其辖区内上市公司的实际税负越低。进一步分析发现，地方政府经济竞争对辖区企业的减税效应存在显著的地区、产业和所有制异质性；分位数回归发现，辖区企业处于不同税负强度时，地方政府经济竞争的减税效应也存在明显差异。在当前减税降费、让利于企的新时代背景下，本文的研究对落实减税降费政策和规范横向竞争中地方政府行为具有启示意义。     

新发展阶段与建立现代财税体制*

本文基于我国即将进入全面建设社会主义现代化国家新征程的新发展阶段，回顾了党的十八大以来的财税改革经验，锚定“十四五”规划和2035年远景目标，研究了新发展阶段对深化财税体制改革的要求，从深化预算体制改革、理顺央地财政关系、提升现代税收治理、健全债务管理制度、推进财税法治建设五个方面把握中国特色现代财税体制发展，持续为建立现代财税体制提供理论佐证。     

CEO age and tax planning

This study investigates the association between CEO age and corporate tax planning. Using a sample of 11,537 firm‐year observations from the fiscal year 1997–2013, I find CEO age exerts an economically significant influence on firms’ tax policies, incremental to economic determinants identified in prior research. Specifically, CEO age is positively related to cash and GAAP effective tax rates, and negatively related to permanent book‐tax difference, suggesting that older CEOs are less likely to take actions to lower tax burden. The results hold across different model specifications and robustness tests to address potential bias arising from endogeneity, sample selection issue, and the confounding effect of CEO tenure.